Abstract: This paper studies the effects of a path change in government debt composition and aggregate transfers on allocations and prices. It is shown that the effects are zero under some agent-specific transfer scheme even when markets are incomplete. If markets are complete, then the effects are zero under any transfer scheme that leaves each agent's lifetime resource unchanged if and only if agents are always collectively compensated for next period's return change. The infinite-horizon framework used has an arbitrary number of assets with arbitrary returns and an arbitrary mixture of finitely and infi nitely lived agents.
Introduction
Since the celebrated work of Modigliani and Miller (1958) , economists have developed a host of equivalence theorems. These include refinements of the original Modigliani-Miller (henceforth MM) Theorem, most notably by Stiglitz (1969 Stiglitz ( , 1974 and DeMarzo (1988) , and the Ricardian equivalence results starting with Barro (1974) . Wallace (1981) and Chamley and Polemarchakis (1984) study the change of government debt composition through open market exchanges. Their equivalence results are reviewed by Sargent (1987) .
Changes in government debt composition through open market exchanges are not directly covered by the MM Theorem because government bonds are outside assets. In the standard MM setting, the equivalence result obtains because total asset payoffs do not change. Open market exchanges cause asset supplies to undergo real changes. With all assets held, the total payoffs agents receive will change. The payoff changes show up in the government budget. If the government keeps its spending unchanged, then by an accounting identity, total transfers (taxes if negative) must change to exactly cancel the total payoff changes and the revenues from open market exchanges in any state of nature. In this context, a change in government finance consists of a path change in debt composition and the accompanying changes in total transfers, and the equivalence question is whether some new, agent-specific transfer scheme that implies the required total transfers can (1) keep the optimal consumption of each agent unchanged and (2) cause the asset markets to clear. For a representative agent economy, the transfer scheme that implies a given set of total transfers is unique, and the equivalence issue is the same as the relevance of government finance issue. In a more general setting, the equivalence issue is related to the relevance of government finance issue in a narrower sense: there is equivalence when a change in government finance is irrelevant under a specific transfer scheme. By covering changes of debt composition (with perhaps zero accompanying changes in transfers), our equivalence concept may be regarded as a generalization of the Ricardian equivalence concept, which focuses on the equivalence between debt and taxes (transfers).
Our study is based on the assumption that the government has the power to impose agent specific, state specific lump-sum transfers. While such a government does not exist in the real world, it still has to rely on private incentives and is far less powerful than the idealized central planner. It is this limit to governmental power that keeps the equivalence issue non-trivial.
In an interesting special case, Wallace (1981) shows that any transfer scheme that keeps each agent's lifetime resource unchanged and satisfies another condition can cancel a change in government finance and leave allocations as well as asset prices unchanged. Wallace's complete market framework has two-date lives and a special asset structure (fiat money plus one-period assets). This paper extends the Wallace result by allowing an arbitrary number of assets with arbitrary returns and an arbitrary mixture of finitely and infinitely lived agents.
In Chamley and Polemarchakis (1984) , there is no need for transfer changes because payoff changes are exactly canceled by the revenues from open market exchanges. The flexible price level changes in such a way that the real returns of the sole nominal asset become a weighted average of its initial returns and the returns of the real asset whose supply is changed, and the effects of open market exchanges are thereby perfectly canceled. Elegant as it is, their result, which is valid even with incomplete markets, is subject to a number of qualifications and seems difficult to generalize. The qualifications have to do with the side effects of a price level change. The situation is reminiscent of Stiglitz (1974) and DeMarzo (1988) , who establish the validity of the MM Theorem with incomplete markets under the condition that one asset's payoffs are independent of another asset's price. This condition, whose importance is demonstrated by Gottardi (1994 Gottardi ( , 1995 and Detemple, Gottardi and Polemarchakis (1995) , can remain satisfied even if bankruptcies are allowed, but is usually unsatisfied in the presence of instruments such as stock options. The parallel condition for the validity of the ChamleyPolemarchakis result, about which we will have little more to say, is that changes in price level do not affect the equilibrium in undesirable ways. Under normal circumstances, this requires that (1) there is a single nominal asset, (2) there are no nominal transfers, and (3) asset payoffs, which can be contingent contracts, do not depend on the price level. The lengthiness of this list is not surprising; in Chamley and Polemarchakis (1984) a single scalar process (the price level) bears all the burden of restoring equilibrium.
The "money" in both Wallace (1981) and Chamley and Polemarchakis (1984) is the Samuelson-Wallace variety (Samuelson, 1958; Wallace, 1980) : it is held for returns, not for between government bonds and transactional money. In this paper, we will briefly discuss how our formal results fare when transactional money is introduced.
Here is a summary of the paper. Section 2 introduces a general framework of asset markets and individual optimization. A key ingredient of the framework is the government budget constraint, which (under the assumption that there is no government spending) unambiguously identifies the aggregate transfers under a given path for government debt.
Section 3 establishes two equivalence theorems. Theorem 1 shows that the effects of a change in government finance on allocations and prices are zero under some transfer scheme even if markets are incomplete. The proposed transfer scheme is shown to leave each agent's lifetime resource unchanged under any state price process. For a representative agent economy, the proposed transfer scheme is the only one possible, and Theorem 1 becomes a generalized Ricardian equivalence result: it implies that neither the level nor the composition of debt matters.
It is observed that Theorem 1 remains valid in the presence of transactional money as long as the path of money supply does not change.
Section 3 then moves to a complete market setting and explains why it is not generally true that any transfer scheme that leaves the lifetime resource of each agent unchanged can cancel a change in government finance. Theorem 2 shows that a sufficient and necessary condition for any transfer scheme that leaves the lifetime resource of each agent unchanged to be able to cancel a change in government finance is that agents are always collectively compensated for next period's return change. This condition is closely related to the intergenerational links that normally underlie the validity of the Ricardian equivalence. In Theorem 2, intergenerational links are not imposed, but the changes in government finance are restricted to those that do not imply intergenerational transfers. For an economy consisting of infinitely lived "dynasties", the condition is automatically satisfied. It is observed that Theorem 2 is not valid in the presence of transactional money. Section 4 concludes.
The Framework
This section introduces a general framework similar to that of Santos and Woodford (1997 The constraints it faces are:
We have written (3) as an equality on account of increasing preferences. If s t is agent h's initial node h (so that s t -1 is not in N h ), the right side of (3b) does not have the middle term. (5) requires that each agent holds the empty portfolio whenever it dies.
The infimum in (4) is agent h's borrowing limit at s t , assumed to be nonnegative. When infinitely lived agents exist, some borrowing limits are needed in order to rule out the Ponzi scheme. While all kinds of borrowing limits are possible a priori, the "canonical" specification given in (4), which is proposed by Santos and Woodford (1997) , among others, seems the most natural. In (4), {a(s r )} is a state price process defined on N, whose existence is guaranteed by the absence of finite-horizon arbitrage (Ross, 1976; Yu, 1998 
The equivalence question is whether there exist { $ L h (s t ), $ Z h 3 (s t )} satisfying (9) and (8) (Sidrauski, 1967; Brock, 1974; Clower, 1967; Lucas and Stokey, 1987 .) It is clear from the proof that Theorem 1 will remain valid as long as the path of money supply does not change; in the new equilibrium, the money holding of each agent stays unchanged.
Agent h's lifetime resource as valued by state price process {a(s r )} is given by:
Recall that h is agent h's unique initial node. By (15) The difficulty arises because agents in H(s 0 ) must hold the changed asset supply at s 0 in any equilibrium, but they are not compensated for the return changes on the t = 1 nodes that the supply change at s 0 causes. The remedy is then to introduce transfers that compensate the return changes. When all the agents in H(s 0 ) have two-date lives, the compensating transfers have to be made at the t = 1 nodes. In the more general case, some of the compensating transfers can be made at the t > 1 nodes. The compensating transfers are needed not only for s 0 , but also for every other node. As the theorem below shows, given complete markets, these compensating transfers and both sufficient and necessary for an "any transfer" result to obtain. When markets are complete, we let {a(s t )} be the unique state price process with a(s 0 ) = 1. 
Then there exists { $ Z h (s t )} satisfying (9) and (8) 
(19) is a slightly more general form of Wallace (1981) 's second requirement for the new transfer scheme.
Multiplying (18) by a(s t+1 ), summing the result over s t+1 |s t and using the basic state price relation (13), we get a useful relation:
Proof of Theorem 2: We first prove the sufficiency part. It is well-known that, with complete markets, the set of attainable consumption for a finitely lived agent is determined entirely by the lifetime resource. The same is true for an infinitely lived agent if borrowing limits are given by (4), as our arguments below will verify. By (17), each agent has the same lifetime resource and so can attain the initial consumption, which remains optimal. The question is whether markets can clear. We will construct a complete set of market clearing asset holdings and show that they imply the initial consumption for each agent and also satisfy all the borrowing limits.
At each node s 
This asset holding guarantees market clearing at s 0 . Define c(s
. Summing (3a) over all agents in H(s 0 ) for both the initial and the new transfers and asset holdings, we get:
By (8a), (23) (18) as it is applied to s 1 |s 0 , we get:
By (24) It is easy to see that the change of asset value by any h at any s t is exactly matched by the change of the future resource viewed at s t . For example, by combining (25) with (26a), we get:
which shows the change of h's asset value at s t is equal to the negative of the change of its future transfers. Therefore, no borrowing limit for any h is violated at any s t .
It is also easy to see that each agent can attain under the initial transfer any consumption it can attain under the new transfer. This establishes the optimality of the new asset holdings and concludes the proof of sufficiency. that agent h changes its money holdings, and this calls for overall re-optimization by agent h, including changes in consumption. We therefore cannot expect that there exists a new equilibrium with the same consumption patterns and asset prices. Our conclusion, then, is that Theorem 2 is not valid in the presence of transactional money.
Conclusion
Wallace ( Wallace's suggestion and establishes two general equivalence theorems for government finance.
20
The theorems are applicable to the kind of open market exchanges found in Wallace (1981) .
They may also be regarded as generalized Ricardian equivalence results.
